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       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3976 
___________ 
 
BAJRAM ADEMAJ, 
                                       Petitioner  
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                              Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A089-253-909) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Susan G. Roy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 11, 2012 
Before:  FISHER, WEIS and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: July 17, 2012) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Bajram Ademaj petitions for review of a final order of removal.  For the 
reasons discussed below, we will deny the petition for review. 
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I. 
 Inasmuch as we are writing primarily for the parties who are familiar with 
the facts, we will recite them only as necessary to our decision.  Ademaj, a native 
of the former Yugoslavia and citizen of Kosovo, entered the United States in July 
2007, and filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture.  He was thereafter served 
with a Notice to Appear charging him as removable under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien present without being admitted or paroled.  At a 
hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”), Ademaj admitted the factual 
allegations underlying the charge and conceded removability. 
 At a subsequent hearing regarding his requests for relief, Ademaj testified 
that he left Kosovo because he and his family endured threats and suffered physical 
and psychological mistreatment at the hands of Albanian extremists.   Ademaj 
claimed that, although he and his family were ethnic Albanians and Muslims, the 
majority culture in Kosovo, they were viewed as traitors by Albanian extremists 
because his parents had aided in the construction of a Serbian Orthodox Church 
prior to the war that ultimately separated Kosovo from Serbia and Montenegro.  In 
addition to mistreatment inspired by his family’s activities, Ademaj claimed that he 
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was personally targeted for mistreatment by members of extremist Albanian 
organizations and political parties due to his support for the Democratic League of 
Kosovo (“LDK”).  As a result, he was repeatedly threatened with death and, on one 
occasion, was beaten unconscious with an iron rod.   
 The IJ found that Ademaj had testified credibly and determined that the 
mistreatment he suffered constituted past persecution.  Although that gave rise to a 
presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution, the IJ concluded that there had 
been a fundamental change in circumstances in Kosovo and that Ademaj had not 
otherwise established a well-founded fear of future persecution.   The IJ also held 
that Ademaj’s past mistreatment was insufficiently egregious to justify 
humanitarian asylum, denied all relief, and ordered his removal. 
 The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Ademaj’s appeal.  It 
held that “even if [Ademaj] established past persecution on account of a protected 
ground, the [Government] has rebutted the presumption of a well-founded fear of 
persecution by demonstrating that there has been a fundamental change in 
circumstances such that [Ademaj] no longer has a well-founded fear of 
persecution.”  The BIA cited two changes in circumstance in support: (1) the LDK 
controls the presidency of Kosovo and governs the country as part of a coalition 
government; and (2) after Ademaj left Kosovo, it became an independent nation.  
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In light of his return trips to Kosovo and the fact that his parents continue to live 
openly there without suffering any significant harm, the BIA likewise affirmed the 
IJ’s determination that Ademaj had not established a well-founded fear of future 
persecution.  The BIA also agreed that Ademaj was ineligible for a grant of 
humanitarian asylum, and it affirmed the IJ’s denial of relief.   Ademaj timely 
petitioned this Court for review.  
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. ' 1252(a).  Because the BIA 
issued its own opinion, we review its decision rather than that of the IJ.  See Li v. 
Att=y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005).  However, we also look to the 
decision of the IJ to the extent that the BIA deferred to or adopted the IJ=s 
reasoning.  See Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).  We 
review factual determinations for substantial evidence, and will uphold such 
determinations unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach a 
contrary conclusion.  See Fiadjoe v. Att=y Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 153 (3d Cir. 2005).  
The BIA=s discretionary decision to deny asylum on humanitarian grounds must be 
upheld unless it is manifestly contrary to law and an abuse of discretion.  See 8 
U.S.C. ' 1252(b)(4)(D).   
III. 
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 Ademaj challenges the BIA’s determinations that he was ineligible for 
humanitarian asylum and that the presumption of a well-founded fear of future 
persecution was rebutted by changed country conditions.
1
 
A.  Humanitarian Asylum 
 “[I]n limited circumstances past persecution alone may warrant a grant of 
asylum, even in the absence of a future threat of persecution.”  Al-Fara v. 
Gonzales, 404 F.3d 733, 740 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 
16 (BIA 1989)).  This so-called “humanitarian asylum” is reserved for those 
applicants who have suffered particularly atrocious persecution.  See Sheriff v. 
Att’y Gen., 587 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that persecution entitling an 
alien to humanitarian asylum “must have been extreme” and “atrocious”).   It has 
historically been granted to Holocaust survivors, victims of the Chinese “Cultural 
Revolution,” and survivors of the Cambodian genocide, and has been extended in 
other extremely serious cases.  See id. at 594-95 (remanding to BIA for 
consideration of humanitarian asylum claim where applicant=s home was burned to 
                                              
1
  We agree with the Government that, although Ademaj referred to a claim of a denial of 
due process when the IJ disallowed his testimony regarding his siblings, the claim was 
not developed in Ademaj’s brief and is therefore waived.  See Laborers' Int'l Union of N. 
Am. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that an issue is 
waived unless party raises it in opening brief, and reference in passing is not sufficient).  
Ademaj has also waived any challenge to the BIA’s denial of his requests for withholding 
of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture by failing to raise those 
issues in his brief.  See id. 
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the ground, and her family members were murdered, injured, and raped); see also 
Brucaj v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 602, 609-11 (7th Cir. 2004) (remand where BIA 
failed to consider claim of applicant who was gang-raped and beaten by soldiers in 
front of her parents); Vongsakdy v. INS, 171 F.3d 1203, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(granting humanitarian asylum to applicant who was placed in a labor camp, 
permanently injured, denied adequate food, and subjected to Communist 
“reeducation” program).   
 Ademaj argues that the mistreatment he suffered was sufficiently egregious 
to qualify him for humanitarian relief.  While we agree with the BIA that his 
mistreatment was deplorable, it falls short of the atrocities contemplated in the 
cases mentioned above.  The BIA’s denial of humanitarian asylum was therefore 
not “manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(4)(D). 
B.  Fear of Future Persecution 
 An alien who establishes past persecution is presumed to have a well-
founded fear of future persecution on the basis of the original claim. See 8 C.F.R. § 
208.13(b)(1); Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 326 (3d Cir. 2004).  However, 8 
C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A) also provides that 
an immigration judge ... shall deny the asylum 
application of an alien found to be a refugee on the basis 
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of past persecution if [it] is found by a preponderance of 
the evidence [that] [t]here has been a fundamental change 
in circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a 
well-founded fear of persecution in the applicant's 
country of nationality . . . . 
Generalized improvements in country conditions are insufficient to rebut evidence 
establishing past persecution; rather “evidence of changed country conditions can 
successfully rebut an alien’s fear of future persecution based on past persecution 
only if that evidence addresses the specific basis for the alien’s fear of 
persecution.”  Berishaj, 378 F.3d at 327; see also Sheriff, 587 F.3d at 589-91. 
 Ademaj contends that the BIA erred by failing to analyze changed country 
conditions as they relate to the facts of his case and that the facts it relied upon 
were unrelated to his past mistreatment.  Specifically, the BIA based its 
determination on two distinct facts: (1) the LDK now controls the presidency and 
governs the country as part of a coalition government; and (2) Kosovo became an 
independent country in 2008.  Although, as Ademaj argues, the LDK controlled the 
Kosovar government at the time of his past mistreatment, that earlier government 
was still in the process of assuming responsibility over the country’s administration 
at the time he fled.  A.R. at 169 (U.S. State Department, 2008 Human Rights 
Report: Kosovo at 1 (noting that the Kosovar government “gradually assumed 
authority and responsibilities in most areas” during the year leading up to its 
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declaration of independence)).  Put another way, although the LDK controlled the 
government at the time Ademaj was persecuted, that government did not control 
the country.  In the intervening years, Kosovo has become independent and the 
government, still led by the LDK, exerts increased influence over the country 
itself. Id.  In light of this increased governmental control, we are not compelled to 
disagree with the BIA’s determination that there has been a fundamental change in 
circumstances such that Ademaj no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution.   
 We likewise are not compelled to disagree that Ademaj did not otherwise 
establish that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution.  As we noted in 
Toure v. Attorney General, “[g]enerally, evidence of similarly-situated family 
members’ continued presence in the country where the persecution allegedly 
occurred is more probative of whether the petitioner will suffer persecution if he 
were returned to his home country than whether he suffered persecution in the 
past.” 443 F.3d 310, 319 (3d Cir. 2006).  In this case, Ademaj’s parents—whose 
assistance to Serbian nationals he claims resulted in much of the mistreatment he 
suffered—have remained in Kosovo and continue to operate a restaurant there.  
Ademaj provided no evidence that they have suffered any significant harm as a 
result.  Accordingly, BIA’s determination that Ademaj failed to demonstrate a  
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well-founded fear of persecution is supported by substantial evidence.
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IV. 
 In sum, because the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying humanitarian 
asylum and because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that 
Ademaj did not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, we will deny 
the petition for review. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
                                              
2
  Because the BIA’s determination that Ademaj did not otherwise establish that he has a 
well-founded fear of future persecution is adequately supported by other evidence, any 
alleged error in the BIA’s analysis of his return trips to Kosovo was harmless and we 
need not address his challenge to that aspect of the BIA’s decision.  Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y 
Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e will view an error as harmless and not 
necessitating a remand to the BIA when it is highly probable that the error did not affect 
the outcome of the case.”). 
